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  • VIEW 6,725
  • 2008.10.16 17:34
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¹«µð½º´Â "°­¸¸¼ö ±âȹÀçÁ¤ºÎ Àå°üÀÌ Áö³­ 13ÀÏ ÀºÇà ¿ÜäÀÇ ¸¸±â¿¬ÀåÀ» È®½ÇÈ÷ Áö¿øÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó°í ¸»Çß´Ù"¸ç "Çѱ¹Àº ÀºÇà¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Á¦µµÀû Áö¿øÀÌ °­ÇÑ ³ª¶ó·Î ÇÊ¿äÇÏ´Ù¸é(2400¾ï´Þ·¯¿¡ ´ÞÇÏ´Â ¿Üȯº¸À¯¾×À¸·Î) °í°­µµÀÇ Áö¿ø¿¡ ³ª¼³ °Í"À̶ó°í Àü¸ÁÇß´Ù.

ÇÑÆí À̳¯ ¹«µð½º Åè ¹ø ±¹°¡½Å¿ëµî±Þ ´ã´ç ºÎ»çÀåÀº "ÇöÀç·Î¼­´Â Çѱ¹ÀÇ ½Å¿ëµî±ÞÀ» º¯°æÇÒ °èȹÀÌ ¾øÀ¸¸ç ½Å¿ëµî±ÞÀ» ÇÏÇâÁ¶Á¤ÇÑ´Ù´Â ¼Ò¹®¿¡ ´ëÇؼ­µµ µé¾îº» Àû ¾ø´Ù"°í ¸»Çß´Ù°í ÀϺΠ¿Ü½ÅÀÌ º¸µµÇß´Ù.

[Korean Banking System¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÄÚ¸àÆ® Àü¹®]

Korea has more negative rating outlooks on its banks than any other system in Asia, primarily due to its dependence on the stricken international capital and money markets for funding. Our industry outlook for the system is also negative, a characteristic it shares with many other regional banking systems.

Korea is one of the few banking systems in Asia where domestic deposits are insufficient to fund loans; loan to deposit ratios range from 130% to over 300%. Therefore, the country¡¯s banks must rely on the wholesale funding markets for about 44% of their funding and are still reliant on the international markets for 10-12%.

Reluctant to pay the much higher borrowing spread over past year, most banks delayed issuing long-term cross-border debt, expecting conditions to normalize in 2H2008. As we now know, market conditions got worse instead. But the banks continue to refinance in the short-term debt markets.

On October 13, Kang Man-Soo, Minister of Strategy and Finance, told reporters, ¡°We will fully support banks to roll over their debts with foreign exchange reserves, lest they default.¡± Moody¡¯s also considers Korea to be a high support system, which would -- if it were necessary -- assist the banks in meeting their obligations. Furthermore, the government has over $240bn of foreign currency reserves with which to back up this promise.

The domestic funding market has shown less stress than before, but prices continue to rise. At the same time, deposits are rising as funds return from broker cash management accounts now that equity investments are less attractive. Banks have been able to increase their issuance in the long-term won debenture market. As yet there has not been any need for the Bank of Korea to expand repo-able assets to help banks fund in local currency, so they have not done so. But we believe it would, if necessary.

Barring liquidity, bank fundamental in Korea are good. The average BFSR is C- , and the average deposit rating is single-A, both about average globally. As for most of the rest of Asia, we have a negative banking industry outlook for Korea, reflecting the more difficult operating environment the banks are facing as the global economy slows.

For example, net interest margins are already under pressure from competition and higher funding costs. While the former may slacken, the latter could linger. NPLs will inevitably rise. Losses from sub-prime-related assets and failed banks have been managed within earnings. Reparations on KIKO sales, should they be required, are unlikely to exceed earnings, particularly if they are shared with purchasers.

Despite our concerns, Korean banks will face the deteriorating global economy with unimpaired capital (Tier 1 averages 8.75%) NPLs at a cyclical low of less than 1% of gross loans.



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